Data corruption, systematic or adversarial, may skew statistical estimation severely. Recent work provides computationally efficient estimators that nearly match the information-theoretic optimal statistic. Yet the corruption model they consider measures sample-level corruption and is not finegrained enough for many real-world applications. In this paper, we propose a coordinate-level metric of distribution shift over high-dimensional settings with n coordinates. We introduce and analyze robust mean estimation techniques against an adversary who may hide individual coordinates of samples while being bounded by that metric. We show that for structured distribution settings, methods that leverage structure to fill in missing entries before mean estimation can improve the estimation accuracy by a factor of approximately n compared to structure-agnostic methods. We also leverage recent progress in matrix completion to obtain estimators for recovering the true mean of the samples in settings of unknown structure. We demonstrate with real-world data that our methods can capture the dependencies across attributes and provide accurate mean estimation even in high-magnitude corruption settings.
Introduction
Data corruption is an impediment to modern machine learning deployments. Corrupted data entries, i.e., data vectors with either noisy or with missing values, can severely skew the statistical properties of a sample, and can therefore bias statistical estimates and lead to invalid inferences. To alleviate the impact of corrupted data on statistical estimation, recent robust estimators can be used in settings where less than half the data entries are corrupted [Diakonikolas and Kane, 2019] . This assumption is closely connected to the Huber contamination model [Huber, 1992] that underlies much of the existing robust estimation literature. The Huber contamination model allows an adversary to introduce an ǫ-fraction of outliers or deletions where each data vector is either completely clean or completely corrupted. As a result, distributional discrepancies for this corruption model are closely related to the total variation distance (d TV ). Under the Huber contamination model, estimators with robustness certificates rely either on filtering or down-weighting corrupted data vectors to reduce their influence [Diakonikolas et al., 2017 , Diakonikolas et al., 2019a . In many applications, however, we can have partially corrupted data entries and even all data vectors can be partially corrupted. For example, in DNA microarrays measurement errors can occur for batches of genes [Troyanskaya et al., 2001a] . Filtering or down-weighting an entire data vector can waste the information contained in the clean coordinates of the vector. These limitations motivate the study of robust statistics under corruption models that are associated with more fine-grained measures of distance between distributions.
Problem Summary We focus on robust estimation under coordinate-level corruption per sample. We propose a measure of distribution shift, referred to as d ENTRY , which models adversaries that can be stronger than those associated with d TV . Metric d ENTRY enables us to capture adversaries that can strategically corrupt specific coordinates per sample, and thus, for a fixed budget, they can corrupt more samples than adversaries that corrupt samples completely.
We study adversaries that introduce missing values and consider a worst-case or adversarial framework. This choice is motivated by cases where the corruption is systematic rather than easily modeled as random noise. Systematically missing data is arguably a common issue encountered by machine learning practitioners when analyzing real-world data. For example, it is prevalent in gene expression analysis [Troyanskaya et al., 2001a] and a core challenge related to dropout measurements in sensor arrays [Swanson, 2001] . Under this corruption model, we study the problem of robust mean estimation. Given a corrupted sample from a distribution with unknown mean vector µ we want to find a vectorμ that closely approximates µ. We focus on estimators with small Mahalanobis distance, i.e., ||μ − µ|| Σ = |(μ − µ) T Σ −1 (μ − µ)| 1/2 .
Main Results
We first compare adversaries bounded by d ENTRY against those bounded by d TV . We show that, given a data set with n coordinates, d ENTRY -bounded adversaries can introduce more corrupted samples than d TV -bounded adversaries by a multiplicative factor of O(n). The reason is that under the corruption model associated with d ENTRY , adversaries can corrupt specific coordinates per data sample, and thus, can allocate their budget more effectively.
We also study settings where the observed data set exhibits redundancy due to correlations among the coordinates of the observed data vectors. This analysis is motivated by recent applied results in data cleaning under systematic corruption [Rekatsinas et al., 2017 , Wu et al., 2020 that exploit structure in a corrupted data set to learn statistical measures of the clean data distribution, and use those measures to achieve state-of-the-art performance in tasks such as error detection [Heidari et al., 2019] and missing data imputation [Wu et al., 2020] . We examine cases where the observed data samples are generated via a linear transformation from a lower-dimensional space to a higher-dimensional space.
We consider the case where the data sample X, before corruption is introduced, corresponds to X = Az where z is a lower-dimensional vector drawn from an unknown distribution D z . For such linear transformations, we show that the key quantity that determines the power of a d ENTRY -bounded adversary is the minimum number of rows that one needs to remove from A to reduce its row space by one. This quantity, denoted m A , can take values in 1 ≤ m A ≤ n, where n is the number of coordinates in the observed data. We show that in the presence of redundancy, we can devise robust estimators that leverage the structure of the data to reduce the strength of d ENTRY adversaries to that of the standard d TV adversaries, thus, closing the aforementioned multiplicative gap. The above result holds for adversaries that are not restricted to deletion but can also perform value replacements in the observed samples.
We further focus on the problem of robust mean estimation in the presence of d ENTRY adversaries that are limited to deletions. We show that for Gaussian distributions N (µ, Σ) where the covariance Σ is full rank, the problem of robust mean estimation the multiplicative gap of O(n) becomes Θ(n). This result introduces an information-theoretic limit on robust mean estimation under the contamination model associated with d ENTRY . In this setup, we find that standard robust mean estimation methods that filter corrupted data samples achieve this performance.
For the case of a known matrix A, we show that a two-step procedure where we first use structure-aware data imputation methods to recover missing entries and then apply empirical mean estimation reduces the aforementioned multiplicative gap from Θ(n) to Θ(n/m A ). On the other hand, standard filtering-based robust estimators retain the initial Θ(n) penalty. This result implies that in the presence of highly structured matrices A, i.e., when m A is close to n, the stronger d ENTRY adversary reduces to a d TV adversary, since we can leverage redundancy due to structure to restrict the adversary's power. We also extend these results to the case of unknown matrices A. We show that under bounded budget, we can leverage matrix completion methods designed for deterministic missing patterns [Pimentel-Alarcón et al., 2016] to recover the missing entries and obtain a robust mean estimator that achieves the same performance as in the case with known structure.
Finally, we present an experimental evaluation of the proposed robust estimation methods on synthetic setups as well as five real-world data sets. Our experiments on synthetic data provide empirical validation to our results, and show that leveraging structure for robust mean estimation leads to significant accuracy improvements over prior efficient robust estimators even for corrupted samples that do not follow a Gaussian distribution. In addition, our experiments on real-world data demonstrate that leveraging structure yields similar improvements even in data sets that do not conform to the aforementioned linear transformation model.
Related Work
The literature of robust statistics is growing in many directions.
A significant range of problems is studied, such as robust mean and covariance estimation [Lai et al., 2016 , Daskalakis et al., 2018 , Diakonikolas et al., 2019a , Cheng et al., 2019 , Kontonis et al., 2019 , Zhu et al., 2019 , robust optimization [Charikar et al., 2017 , Diakonikolas et al., 2018 , Duchi and Namkoong, 2018 , Prasad et al., 2018 , robust regression [Huber et al., 1973 , Klivans et al., 2018 , Diakonikolas et al., 2019b , Gao et al., 2020 , and computational hardness of robustness [Hardt and Moitra, 2013 , Klivans and Kothari, 2014 , Diakonikolas et al., 2019b , Hopkins and Li, 2019 . We describe works related to our paper.
Robust mean estimation There has been a lot of progress in robust mean estimation, especially to find computationally efficient algorithms that scale well in high dimensions [Lai et al., 2016 , Diakonikolas et al., 2019a . These algorithms are based on Huber contamination model [Huber, 1992] or similar models with a sample-level adversary bounded by d TV . We present a detailed comparison with the estimators considered in those works under coordinatelevel corruption.
Entry-level Corruption Zhu et al. [Zhu et al., 2019] defined a family of resilient distributions in which robust estimation is possible and proposed a framework of perturbations under any Wasserstein distance, which can be seen as a generalization of the d ENTRY metric we define. We expand the notion of new perturbation further in robust mean estimation of structured distributions. On the other hand, Loh and Tan [Loh and Tan, 2018] studied learning the sparse precision matrix of the data in the presence of cell-level noise but under a d TV -style adversary. We expand on more fine-grained metrics in our work, but extending our analysis to the robust estimation of the precision matrix would be an interesting extension.
Missing Data Imputation State-of-the-art methods for data imputation demonstrate that leveraging the redundancy in the observed data yields high accuracy, even in the presence of systematic noise. Singular value decomposition (SVD) based imputation methods [Troyanskaya et al., 2001b , Mazumder et al., 2010 assume linear relations across coordinates. Bertsimas et al. [Bertsimas et al., 2017] uses K-nearest neighbors, support vector machines, and tree based methods to learn the structure and impute missing values. AimNet [Wu et al., 2020 ] discovers more complex non-linear structures using attention-based mechanisms. Our theoretical analysis provides intuition as to why these methods outperform solutions that only rely on coordinate-wise statistics.
Coordinate-level Corruption
In this section, we define the coordinate-level measures of distribution shift (d ENTRY ) and the adversaries considered in this work. We also compare the proposed measures and adversaries with total variation distance and the standard ǫ-fraction adversary considered in the robustness literature. All results presented in this section apply to corruption that corresponds to both missing values and value replacements. All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Corruption Models
We consider that the observed data follows an adversarially corrupted distribution that lies within some ǫ-ball from the true distribution according to a discrepancy d. We consider that corruption occurs to N samples first drawn from the true distribution D and then corrupted. Given N samples x 1 , . . . , x n from distribution D on R n , the adversary is allowed to inspect the samples and perform one of the following corruptions:
• Sample-level adversary (A 1 ): The adversary is allowed to remove up to ǫ · N of them and replace them with arbitrary vectors. • Value-fraction adversary (A 2 ): The adversary is allowed to remove up to ρ · N values in each coordinate and replace them with arbitrary values. • Coordinate-fraction adversary (A 3 ): The adversary is allowed to remove α-fraction of the coordinates in expectation over the samples (up to α · n · N values in the data set) and replace them with arbitrary values.
Adversary A 1 corresponds to the standard adversary associated with Huber's contamination model, which either corrupts a sample completely or leaves it intact. Adversaries A 2 and A 3 are more fine-grained and can corrupt only part of the entries of a sample. The difference between A 2 and A 3 is that the fraction being hidden per coordinate is restricted for A 2 , while A 3 is able to focus all corruption on a single coordinate.
For sufficiently large N , we can use the total variation distance d TV to quantify the shift of the distribution introduced by A 1 , which is d TV (D, D ′ ) = ǫ, where D ′ is the distribution after corruption. However, for A 2 and A 3 , d TV would be misleading because a sample with one missing coordinate and a sample with many missing coordinates would be considered equally corrupted under it. It is more appropriate to differentiate between these cases and model corruption based on each coordinate than whole samples. Thus, we propose a new type of metric, referred to as d ENTRY , which can be used to measure coordinate-level corruption.
Definition 1 (d ENTRY ) . For x, y ∈ R n , define I(x, y) = [½ x1 =y1 , . . . , ½ xn =yn ] ⊤ , an indicator for each coordinate.
For distributions D 1 , D 2 on R n ,
is the set of all couplings of D 1 and D 2 .
These metrics can describe the distribution shift due to corruptions introduced by adversaries A 2 and A 3 . Specifically, the maximum distance that A 2 can shift D by is d ∞ ENTRY = ρ. Similarly, the maximum distance that A 3 can shift D by is d 1 ENTRY = α. Next, we analyze the strength of adversaries A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 in more detail.
Adversary Analysis and Comparison
Adversaries A 2 and A 3 are more fine-grained than the sample-level adversary A 1 since they have the freedom to corrupt individual entries of the samples. Similarly, A 3 is more fine-grained than A 2 . As a result, the strength of A 2 and A 3 , i.e., the magnitude of the distribution shift they can introduce, can vary in a wider range than that of A 1 . We next provide a more detailed comparison of these three adversaries in terms of strength (1) for arbitrary distributions and (2) in the presence of highly structured data.
Arbitrary distributions
We first consider the case when the coordinate-level adversaries A 2 and A 3 have limited budget and can corrupt a smaller number of samples than A 1 . Formally, we have the next proposition. Proposition 1. If α, ρ ≤ ǫ/n, then A 1 can simulate A 2 and A 3 , and thus A 1 is stronger.
In the same way, when α, ρ ≥ ǫ, A 2 and A 3 can simulate sample-level corruptions. Furthermore, we show how the strength of A 2 and A 3 compare.
Hence when α = ρ = ǫ, i.e. when the total number of missing entries are the same, both A 2 and A 3 are stronger A 1 . Directly from the definitions of A 1 and A 3 and Proposition 2, we have that when α ≥ ǫ, there are distributions for which the coordinate-level adversary A 3 can corrupt O(n)-times more samples than adversary A 1 .
Structured data The previous analysis shows that A 3 is significantly stronger for arbitrary distributions. However, the characterization due to Propositions 1 and 2 is quite loose as the gap between ǫ/n and ǫ is large. This gap raises the natural question: Are there distributions for which this gap is more tight, and hence, we can restrict the power of the coordinate-level adversary A 3 to be comparable to that of the sample-level adversary A 1 ?
We show that for distributions that exhibit structure, i.e., redundancy across the coordinates of the observed samples, we can reduce the strength of the coordinate-level adversary to roughly that of the sample-level adversary. This means that although the coordinate-level corruption model is more fine-grained and stronger, by using structure to our advantage, we can robustly estimate the mean roughly as accurately as that for sample-level corruption. We formalize the notion of structure next.
where D z generates samples z i ∈ R r and F : R r → R n represents the underlying structure. We consider the case where the structure is linear, i.e.,
We consider that the data sample before corruption corresponds to x = Az and assume that corruption is introduced in x. Matrix A introduces redundancy in the corrupted, observed data samples. This allows us to detect corruption that may be introduced in the data and in many cases allows us to recover the true value of corrupted entries, e.g., by solving a system of linear equations (see Section 4.2). In fact, we measure the strength of the redundancy that A introduces by considering its row space. Note that the coordinates of x = Az, and hence, the corrupted data, will exhibit high redundancy when many rows of A span a small subspace. Following this intuition, we define the following quantity to describe how tolerant A is to retaining its row space. Definition 3 (m A ). Given a structured sample F (z) = Az with A ∈ R n×r we define m A to be the minimum number of rows one needs to remove from A to reduce the dimension of its row space by one.
As we show below, m A is the key quantity that quantifies how robust estimation can be against coordinate-level corruptions. For example, when A is the identity matrix I we have that m I = 1 and hence we can remove any row 
and reduce its row space, thus, we have low redundancy. On the other hand, for the matrix A = [e 1 , . . . , e 1 ] ⊤ , we have that m A = n because we have to remove all e 1 's in A to reduce the dimension of its row space. Overall, it is not hard to see that 1 ≤ m A ≤ n.
We next show that the higher the value that m A takes for a matrix A, the weaker a coordinate-level adversary becomes due to the increased redundancy. Intuitively, the coordinate-level adversary has to spend more budget per sample to introduce corruptions that will counteract the redundancy introduced by matrix A. As a consequence, the coordinatelevel adversary cannot alter the original distribution too far in total variation distance, leading to more accurate robust estimation techniques. We have the following theorem.
This theorem states that as m A → n, metric d ENTRY , which bounds the power of the coordinate-level adversaries, is almost equal to d TV , which bounds the sample-level adversary. We derive the following corollary.
Therefore, when we have structure, we can extend our results in Proposition 1 to more accurately characterize the relative strength of the two adversaries. The next proposition follows directly from Corollary 1 and shows when the coordinate-level adversary is unable to replicate the corruption caused by the sample-level adversary. Proposition 3. If α, ρ ≤ m A ǫ/n, then a sample-level adversary can simulate a coordinate-level adversary.
In summary, we have shown that the presence of redundancy in the observed data samples can limit the power of the more flexible coordinate-level adversary. In the next sections, we will show that this redundancy allows us to devise robust estimators that enjoy better estimation accuracy guarantees than the standard filtering-based robust estimation methods inspired by sample-level corruption schemes.
Robust Mean Estimation and Structure
We consider the problem of mean estimation for Gaussian distributions and cases where data corruption corresponds to deletion. We show that the redundancy (structure) in the observed data can reduce the power of a coordinatelevel adversary to approximately that of a sample-level adversary via structure-aware robust estimation techniques. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we provide tight bounds for mean estimation under sample-level and coordinate-level corruption given no structure and the exact structure of A. We highlight that m A is the key quantity that determines these information-theoretic limits. Then, we show how to leverage structure when A is unknown in Section 4.3. Table 1 summarizes all results presented in this section. All results hold for adversary budgets bounded away from 0.5 and for a sufficiently large sample size N . All proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Mean Estimation with No Structure
When there is no structure to the data, the samples do not lie in a lower-dimensional space, i.e., we have that x ∼ N (µ, Σ) where Σ is full rank. This problem then reduces to mean estimation of a non-degenerate Gaussian, which has been studied extensively in variants of the A 1 -corruption models. Here, we prove new tight bounds for mean estimation under adversaries A 2 and A 3 . Specifically, we show that robust mean estimation is much harder under coordinate-level corruption when we do not have structure.
Under sample-level corruption (A 1 ) where ǫ-fraction of samples is corrupted, it is well-known that any mean estimator µ has to information-theoretically be Ω(ǫ)-far from the true mean µ in Mahalanobis distance with Σ. On the other hand, the Tukey median [Tukey, 1975] is a mean estimator where μ − µ Σ = O(ǫ). Although finding the Tukey median is computationally intractable in high dimensions, we know that it is an optimal estimator of Θ(ǫ).
Under A 3 , who can corrupt α-fraction of the coordinates in expectation, hidden coordinates cannot be recovered exactly using other visible coordinates because each dimension is independent of each other. Then, if α ≥ 1/n, A 3 can concentrate all corruption in the first coordinate of all samples and, without recovery, we cannot get any estimate of the mean for that coordinate. Thus, the following theorem suggests that coordinate-level corruption is more difficult to tolerate than sample-level corruption.
Theorem 2. Let 0 < αn < 1/2 and Σ ∈ R n×n be a full rank covariance matrix. Given a set of i.i.d. samples from D = N (µ, Σ) where the set is corrupted by A 3 of budget α, an algorithm that outputs a mean estimatorμ must satisfy μ − µ Σ = Ω(αn). Furthermore, there exists an algorithm that obtains error μ − µ Σ = Θ(αn).
Under corruption models A 1 and A 3 , there are optimal algorithms that achieve error guarantees of Θ(ǫ) and Θ(αn), respectively. If α = ǫ, we know that A 3 is a stronger adversary than A 1 , and in terms of error guarantee, A 3 can corrupt the mean with a multiplicative factor of n more than A 1 . Therefore, when no structure is present in the data, there is a significant estimation gap between sample-level and coordinate-level corruption.
Under A 2 , who can corrupt at most ρ-fraction of each coordinate, the information theoretic optimal estimation depends on the structure of the covariance matrix. The exact characterization requires some definitions. For a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix M , we define by s(M ) to be a matrix with entries s(M ) ij = M ij / M ii M jj , i.e. a rescaled version of M so that the diagonal is 1. We also let disc
Theorem 3. Let Σ ∈ R n×n be a full rank covariance matrix. Given a set of i.i.d. samples from N (µ, Σ) where the set is corrupted by A 2 of budget ρ, an algorithm that outputs a mean estimatorμ must satisfy μ−µ Σ = Ω(ρ·disc(Σ −1 )).
Using these results, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Under A 2 , an algorithm that outputs a mean estimatorμ must satisfy μ − µ Σ = Ω(ρ · √ n).
Mean Estimation with Known Structure
We consider the case when we have full information of matrix A. Under sample-level corruption, structure does not help recover missing samples so the previous result of Θ(ǫ) holds for A 1 . We now study how much can structure help with mean estimation under A 2 and A 3 corruption.
With known matrix A, we can recover missing coordinates by solving a linear system of equations using the remaining coordinates in the sample and A. This process is computationally efficient to recover missing coordinates. If we can recover missing coordinates using structure, the best strategy of A 2 or A 3 is to corrupt coordinates so that recovery is computationally difficult or even impossible. To this end, the adversary must corrupt at least m A coordinates for that sample to make coordinate recovery impossible. In fact, the following theorem shows that m A is the key structural quantity that captures the information-theoretic lower bound in robust estimation.
Theorem 4. Assume the setup from Definition 2 where D z = N (µ, I) and let α be the budget for A 3 . Given a set of samples corrupted by A 3 , an algorithm that outputs a mean estimatorμ must satisfy μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = Ω( αn mA ). Furthermore, there exists an algorithm that obtains error μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = Θ( αn mA ).
Theorem 4 shows that for a matrix A where m A ≈ n, the multiplicative gap between mean estimation under A 1 and A 3 becomes nearly 1. This bridged gap implies that leveraging structure by imputation reduces the strength of A 3 (and also A 2 ) to roughly that of a sample-level adversary.
Consider a linear structure A such that each row is sampled uniformly from the unit sphere S r−1 . Then A has rank r and m A = n − r + 1 with probability 1. Similarly, for the matrices considered in [Pimentel-Alarcón et al., 2016] , m A = n − r + 1 for almost every A with respect to the Lebesgue measure on R n×r . Naturally n ≫ r, so the estimation error forμ is approximately Θ(α), which is the bound for A 1 when ǫ = α. Our main result shows that we can restrict the strength of a coordinate-level adversary to that of a sample-level adversary and is informationtheoretically optimal.
Mean Estimation with Unknown Structure
In the real world, we may not know the structure beforehand. Hence, we need to first learn the dependencies that exist between coordinates from the visible entries before we use them to impute the missing ones. When the dependencies are linear, there is a natural connection between matrix completion and missing entry imputation. In this section, we show how matrix completion can help robust mean estimation in the setting of Definitions 2 and 3 and when A is unknown but has m A = n − r + 1. We make the assumption of infinite samples in this section.
We focus on unique recovery as it has the same effects as exact imputation. Corollary 1 in [Pimentel-Alarcón et al., 2016] gives the conditions in which we can uniquely recover a low rank matrix with missing entries. This result goes beyond random missing values and considers deterministic missing-value patterns. We state it here as the following lemma, with small changes made to adapt to our context where each sample can be viewed as one column of a matrix. Lemma 2. Assume the setting in Definitions 2 and 3 plus the condition that A is unknown but has m A = n − r + 1. If there exist r + 1 disjoint groups of n − r samples, and in each group, any k samples have at least r + k dimensions which are not completely hidden, all the samples with at least r visible entries can be uniquely recovered.
The key to matrix completion is learning the r-dimensional subspace spanned by the samples. The samples with more than r visible entries provide some information to identify the subspace. Once the subspace is known, any sample with at least r visible entries can be uniquely recovered.
If we consider the case where the data is corrupted by A 3 , we have the following result. Theorem 5. Assume the setting in Definitions 2 and 3 where A is unknown. Under corruption A 3 with budget α < 1 n , there exists an algorithm that obtains error μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = Θ( αn mA ).
Theorem 5 is based on Theorem 4 and the following lemma. Lemma 3. Assume the setting in Definition 3 plus D z = N (µ, I) and A is unknown. When the data are corrupted by A 3 with budget α, if α ≥ 1 n , we cannot recover any of the samples in the worst case, otherwise we can recover all the samples with less than m A missing entries.
If the data is corrupted by A 2 , we have the following result. Theorem 6. Assume the setting in Definition 3 plus the condition that D z = N (µ, I), and A is unknown but has m A = n − r + 1. Under corruption A 2 with budget ρ < mA−1 n+(mA−1)(mA−2) , there exists an algorithm that obtains error μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = Θ( ρn mA ).
Note that the threshold of the budget in Theorem 6 is greater than or equal to the threshold in Theorem 5. Similar to Theorem 5, Theorem 6 can be obtained from Theorem 4 and the following lemma. Theorem 4 can be applied here because A 3 can simulate A 2 . Lemma 4. When the data are corrupted by A 2 with budget ρ, if ρ ≥ mA−1 n , we cannot recover any of the samples in the worst case; if ρ < mA−1 n+(mA−1)(mA−2) , we can recover all the samples with at least r visible entries.
In summary, the above show that when the budget of the coordinate-level adversaries is bounded we can design structure-aware robust mean estimation methods even when the structure of A is unknown.
Experiments
We present an empirical comparison of robust mean estimation methods on both synthetic and real-world data. We focus on the task of mean estimation and corruptions that correspond to missing values. We seek to empirically validate two points: (1) the accuracy improvements that structure-aware robust estimators yield against standard robust estimators when applied to distributions beyond the Gaussian setting considered in Section 4, and (2) the effect of structure-aware mean estimation on real-world data that might not exhibit dependencies due to linear structure.
Methods and Experimental Setup
We consider the following mean estimation methods:
• Empirical Mean: Take the mean for each coordinate, ignoring all missing entries. • Data Sanitization: Remove any samples with missing entries, and then take the mean of the rest of the data.
• Coordinate-wise Median: Take the median for each coordinate, ignoring all missing entries. • Matrix Completion: Use iterative hard-thresholded SVD (ITHSVD) [Chunikhina et al., 2014] to impute the missing entries. Take the mean afterwards. We use randomized SVD [Halko et al., 2011 ] to accelerate. • Exact Imputation: For each sample, build a linear system based on the structure and solve it. If the linear system is under-determined, do nothing. Then, take the mean while ignoring the remaining missing values.
The methods can be classified into three categories, based on the amount of structural information they leverage:
(1) Empirical Mean, Data Sanitization, and Coordinate-wise Median ignore the structure information;
(2) Matrix Completion assumes there exists some unknown structure but it can be inferred from the visible data; (3) Exact Imputation knows exactly what the structure is and uses it to impute the missing values.
In each experiment presented below, we inject missing values by hiding the smallest ǫ fraction of each dimension. For synthetic data sets, the true mean is derived from the data generation procedure. For real-world data sets, we use the empirical mean of the samples before corruption approximate the true mean. For synthetic data sets, we consider the l 2 and Mahalanobis distances to measure the estimation accuracy of different methods. For real-world data, we only consider the l 2 distance between the estimated mean and the true empirical mean of the data before corruption.
Mean Estimation on Synthetic Data
We show that redundancy in the corrupted data can help improve the robustness of mean estimation. We test all the methods on synthetic data sets with linear structure (x = Az) and three kinds of latent variables (z): Gaussian, Uniform, and Exponential. Each sample x i is generated by x i = Az i , where z i is sampled from the distribution D z describing the latent variable z. We set A to be a diagonal block matrix with two 8 × 4 blocks generated randomly and fixed through the experiments. In every experiment, we consider a sample with 1,000 data vectors. To reduce the effect of random fluctuations, we repeat our experiments for five random instances of the latent distribution D z for each type of latent distribution and take the average error.
The results for the above experiments are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Figure 1 shows the mean estimation error of different methods measured using the Mahalanobis distance, and Figure 2 shows that in l 2 distance. We see that estimators that leverage the redundancy in the observed data to counteract corruption yield more accurate mean estimates. This behavior is consistent across all types of distributions and not only for the case of Gaussian distributions that the theoretical analysis in Section 4 focuses on. We see that the performance of Matrix Completion (when the structure of A is considered unknown) is the same as that of Exact Imputation (when the structure of A is known) when the fraction of missing entries is below a certain threshold. Following our analysis in Section 4.3, this threshold corresponds to the conditions for which the subpace spanned by the samples can be learned from the visible data. Finally, we point out that we do not report results for Data Sanitization when the missing fraction is high because all samples get filtered. Mean Estimation on Real-world Data We turn our attention to settings with real-world data with unknown structure. We use five data sets from the UCI repository [Dua and Graff, 2017] for the experiments in this section. Specifically, we consider: Leaf [Silva et al., 2013] , Breast Cancer Wisconsin [Mangasarian and Wolberg, 1990 ], Blood Transfusion [Yeh et al., 2009] , Wearable Sensor [Torres et al., 2013] , and Mice Protein Expression [Higuera et al., 2015] . For each data set, we consider the numeric features; all of these features are also standardized. For all the data sets, we report the l 2 error. We summarize the size of the data sets along with the rank used for Matrix Completion in Table 2 . As the structure is unknown, we omit exact imputation.
We show the results in Figure 3 . We find that Matrix Completion always outperforms Empirical Mean and Coordinatewise Median on three data sets (Breast Cancer Wisconsin, Wearable Sensor, Mice Protein Expression). For the other two (Leaf, Blood Transfusion), the error of Matrix Completion can be as much as two-times lower than the error of the other two methods for small ǫ's (ǫ < 0.35 for Leaf and ǫ < 0.25 for Blood Transfusion). We also see that the estimation error becomes very high only for large values of ǫ. It is also interesting to observe that Data Sanitization performs worse than the Empirical Mean and the Coordinate-wise Median for real-world data. Recall that the opposite behavior was recorded for the synthetic data setups in the previous section. Overall, these results demonstrate that structureaware robust estimators can outperform the standard filtering-based robust mean estimators even in setups that do not follow the linear structure setup in Section 4.
Discussion and Extensions
We have shown that utilizing redundancy in the observed samples to counteract corruption in both real-world and synthetic data sets can substantially improve estimates of the mean of a distribution; when the level of corruption is below a threshold, these techniques do not require knowing the structure beforehand.
Our results could be extended by considering other forms of structure; our results here have been exclusive to distributions with linear structure. Though approximate linear structure is present in many data sets, more complex forms of structure may result in more accurate recovery of missing entries in real-world data as they could more accurately approximate the true structure of the distribution.
Our model of adversarial corruption could also be extended to allow both hidden and otherwise modified entries as well as random errors in the data. Our experimental results show that leveraging redundancy is beneficial when the data is only approximately structured, making these promising avenues of future investigation. A complete model would also take the computational budget of the defender into account. Finally, our results could be extended to statistics other than the mean and to models of the effect of structure-based imputation as preprocessing for learning algorithms.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new model of data corruption that better represents fine-grained modifications, and allows for stronger and more flexible adversaries. Given such an adversary with a limited budget, we have shown that, given almost any linear structure A, robust mean estimation techniques that leverage structure outperform those that do not. Even when the structure is unknown, we have shown that matrix completion techniques can still make recovery possible; we have demonstrated that such techniques are effective on real-world data.
Real-world data can include missing entries, and rejecting all partially missing samples via data sanitization techniques can result in substantially higher error than techniques which are able to make use of the entries that remain, particularly when compared to those which leverage the structure of the data. Given the redundancy that is often present between features of a sample in many data sets, and as, in real-world settings, these correlations often reflect an underlying structure in the data, using structure-learning techniques and imputation to recover missing or incorrect entries can result in significant improvements being realized in practice.
Appendix
We now provide the proofs for all results stated in the main body of our work. We also provide additional figures from our experimental evaluation that were omitted due to space constraints. Finally, we discuss extensions and future directions related to our work.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that A 3 affects at least one entry in a subset S of all samples. As at least one coordinate per sample is corrupted, S must be at most an α-fraction of all samples; since α ≤ ǫ/n the sample-level adversary can corrupt the entirety of every sample partially corrupted by the coordinate-level adversary, and thus, it is a stronger adversary given this condition. The proof for A 2 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. If α, ρ ≥ ǫ, similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, A 2 and A 3 can simulate A 1 by placing all its corruptions on the ǫN coordinates corrupted by A 1 . If α ≥ ρ, A 3 can simulate A 2 by corrupting the coordinates corrupted by A 2 since A 2 can never corrupt more than ρ-fraction of coordinates in expectation. On the other hand, if α ≤ ρ/n, A 2 can corrupt whatever coordinates A 3 decides to corrupt since A 3 cannot corrupt more than αn-fraction of one coordinate. Thus, the three statements hold.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First, we will show the case for d 1 ENTRY . Now, we can write D 1 = F (D ′ 1 ) and D 2 = F (D ′ 2 ) for some distributions D ′ 1 and D ′ 2 on R r . Suppose that x ∈ ker(A). Now, suppose by way of contradiction that Π i Ax is nonzero for fewer than m A values of i. Call the rows of A v T 0 , . . . , v T n−1 and let S be the subspace of R r spanned by the v i . As x ∈ ker(A), Ax is nonzero. Hence, x, v i is nonzero for some i so Π S x is nonzero. Now, let B be a basis for S containing Π S x. Consider the subspace S ′ of S spanned by {v i | x, v i = 0}. As Π S ′ x = 0, Π S x cannot be an element of S ′ and so B is not a basis for S ′ . Thus, the dimension of S ′ is less than that of S; as {v i } − {v i | x, v i = 0} < m A we have a contradiction of the definition of m A . Thus, if x = 0 ∈ R r , Π i Ax must be nonzero for at least m A values of i, and hence ||Ax|| 0 ≥ m A . Now, suppose that (x, y) ∼ γ for some γ ∈ Γ(D 1 , D 2 ). Then, x = Ax ′ and y = Ay ′ for some x ′ , y ′ ∈ R r . If x = y, then Ax ′ = Ay ′ so x ′ − y ′ ∈ ker(A). Thus Therefore, we have that
In the case of d ∞ ENTRY , the left hand side follows from above by using the fact that
Therefore, the theorem holds for the d ENTRY metric.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. With a budget of α, A 3 can concentrate its corruption on one particular coordinate, say the first coordinate. If αn ≥ 1, we will lose all information for the first coordinate, making mean estimation impossible. Since α < 1/n, A 3 can corrupt αn-fraction of first coordinates of all samples. Since the marginal distribution with respect to the first dimension is a univariate Gaussian, information-theoretically any mean estimator of the first coordinate must be Ω(αn)-far from the true mean of the first coordinate.
Now with a corrupted set of samples, only at most αn-fraction of the samples will be corrupted on one or more coordinates. Then the corrupted distribution D ′ = N (µ ′ , Σ) will have d TV (D, D ′ ) ≤ αn. Therefore, the Tukey medianμ for the corrupted set of samples achieves error μ − µ Σ = O(αn).
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Let x be the maximizer of max x∈[−1,1] x T s(Σ −1 )x and let v be the vector with entries (Σ −1 ii ) −1/2 . To complete the proof, we will show that d ∞ ENTRY (N (µ, Σ), N (µ + ρv, Σ)) ≤ ρ. To do this, we are going to use a hybrid argument showing that by only hiding ρ fraction of the entries in the i-th coordinate, N (µ, Σ) and N (µ + ρ e i /Σ −1/2 ii , Σ)) become indistinguishable. This is because, d TV (N (µ, Σ), N (µ + ρ e i /Σ −1/2 ii , Σ))) ≤ ρ. By applying this argument sequentially for every coordinate, N (µ, Σ) and N (µ + ρv, Σ) are indistinguishable under an A 2 adversary. Since the total distance between µ and µ + ρv in Mahalanobis distance is at least ρ · disc(Σ −1 ), the theorem follows.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We have that s(M ) is a PSD matrix with diagonal elements equal to 1. Consider a random x with uniformly random coordinates in {−1, 1}. For the upper-bound, we notice that since s(M ) is PSD, it holds that |s(M ) ij + s(M ) ji | ≤ 2. To see this notice that x T s(M )x ≥ 0 for both x = e i + e j and x = e i − e j .
Given this, we have that x T s(M )x ≤ 1 2 ij |s(M ) ij + s(M ) ji | ≤ n 2 . This gives the required upper-bound. Notice that the upper-bound is tight for the matrix M consisting entirely of 1's.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Define ǫ be the fraction of samples that has at least one corrupted coordinate. Note that A 3 must corrupt at least m A coordinates of a sample to make his corruptions non-recoverable. Given that we can recover any sample with less than m A corrupted coordinates, we have that ǫ ≤ αn mA . If D is the original distribution on R n and D ′ is the observed distribution, then d TV (D, D ′ ) ≤ ǫ. Since d TV between the two Gaussians is less than or equal to ǫ, the Tukey median algorithm achieves μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = O( αn mA ). For the lower bound, A 3 can corrupt αn mA -fraction of the samples so that the coordinates are non-recoverable and shift part of the original distribution D to anywhere along the axes of missing coordinates. Then, the proof follows the lower bound proof for estimating the mean of a Gaussian corrupted by A 1 . Hence, since we cannot distinguish between two Gaussians that share 1 − αn mA of mass, μ − Aµ AA ⊤ = Ω( αn mA )
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The adversary can simply hide one coordinate completely to prevent us from recovering that coordinate if at least one missing coordinate per sample in expectation is allowed. If the expected number of missing coordinates per sample is less than one, there must then be some positive fraction of samples with no missing coordinates; as we have infinite samples, we can select any r + 1 disjoint sets of n − r such samples to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. First, We introduce the concept of hidden patterns. The set of coordinates missing from a sample forms its hidden pattern. We only consider the hidden patterns which have been applied to infinitely many samples as if only finitely many samples share a pattern, the adversary could hide those samples completely with 0 budget.
When ρ ≥ mA−1 n , the adversary is able to hide m A − 1 entries for every sample, and we cannot learn the structure from samples with only r visible entries.
When ρ < mA−1 n , the adversary does not have enough budget to hide m A − 1 entries of all the samples, so there exist some patterns with at least r + 1 coordinates visible. We use M to denote the number of such patterns, and p l to denote the probability of the l th pattern P l , l = 1, 2, . . . , M .
Next, we show a necessary condition for the adversary to prevent us from learning the structure. Since we have infinitely many samples, one group of n − r samples satisfying the conditions in Lemma 2 is enough to learn the structure since we can find another r groups by choosing samples with the same hidden patterns.
It is obvious that the adversary has to hide at least one coordinate per pattern, otherwise we have infinitely many samples without corruption. No matter what the patterns the adversary provides, we try to get the samples satisfies the conditions in Lemma 2 by the following sampling procedure.
1. Start with one of the patterns, pick r + 1 visible coordinates of it to form the initial visible set V 1 . Take one sample from this pattern to form the initial sample group G 0 . Mark this pattern as checked. 2. For K = 1, 2, 3, . . . , M − 1, take one of the unchecked patterns and check if it contains at least one visible coordinate not in V K , the current visible set. If so, take one sample x K from it and pick any one of its visible coordinates v K / ∈ V K . Add x K to the sample group and v K to the visible set: G K+1 = G K ∪ {x K }, V K+1 = V K ∪ {v K }. If not, skip it. Mark the pattern as checked.
We show by induction that any k(k ≤ K) different samples in G K have at least r +k coordinates in V K not completely hidden. It is trivial that the property holds for K = 1. Assume that the property holds for K. According to the sampling procedure, when a new sample x K comes, it has at least one visible coordinate v K not in V K . Consider any k(k ≤ K + 1) different samples in G K+1 . If the k samples don't include the new sample x K , by the induction assumption they have at least r + k coordinates in V K ⊂ V K+1 not completely hidden. If x K is one of the k samples, again by the induction assumption the other k − 1 samples have at least r + k − 1 coordinates in V K not completely hidden, plus v K of x K is also not hidden, so there are at least r + k coordinates in V K+1 not completely hidden. Thus, the property also holds for K + 1. By induction, any k distinct samples from the group we get at the end of step 2 have at least r + k coordinates not completely hidden, which means if the group has at least n − r samples, the conditions in Lemma 2 can be satisfied.
Denote the set of the patterns being picked as P P and the set of the patterns being skipped as P S . Based on the previous analysis, the adversary has to manipulate the patterns so that |P P | ≤ n − r − 1, in which case the visible set cannot cover all the coordinates, which means there exists at least one common hidden coordinate for the patterns in P S (otherwise the pattern where that coordinate is visible should have been picked). Since the fraction of hidden entries in that common coordinate is less than or equal to ρ, the sum of the probabilities of the patterns in P S satisfies
